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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BRIAN BURNS,
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Brief of the Appellee/
Cross-Appellant

vs.
Case No.
CANNONDALE BICYCLE COMPANY,
THE BICYCLE CENTER, and JOHN
DOES I THROUGH V,

920708-CA

District Court No. 900901567
Category 15

Defendants/Appellees/
Cross-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT ORDER
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT
FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
JUDGE HOMER WILKINSON.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a district court order granting a
Motion for Summary Judgment for the defendant from the Third
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

This Court

has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2-2

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
The following rules are essential to the determination of
this appeal:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c) states in pertinent
part:
. . • The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions/ answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . .

RELEVANT FACTS OF THE CASE
The defendant is in agreement with the plaintiff's
statements concerning the relevant facts of the case with three
exceptions:
(1)
Bicycles.

The Bicycle Center is a retail seller of Cannondale
Appellant's Brief Page 5, Para. 1.

Response:

The defendant, Cannondale Bicycle Company

("CBC")/ is not in agreement with the plaintiff's statement.
Bicycle Center ("BC") is a retail business that sells, among
other things, Cannondale Bicycles. (R. 4 6 9 ) .
(2)

The Bicycle Center repaired the brakes and discarded

the defective parts which had caused the malfunction.
Appellant's Brief Page 6, Para. 6.

2

The

Response:

The defendant CBC is not in agreement with this

statement.

The plaintiff has made an incorrect and unsupported

statement.

It has not been established by any supportable

evidence that the brakes were "defective" or that they were
discarded by the defendant BC.
(3)

Mr. Blomquist admitted that a defect in the bicycle had

caused the accident.
Response:
statement.

Appellant's Brief Page 8, Para. 12, Fn. 1.

The defendant CBC is not in agreement with this

The plaintiff incorrectly states that Mr. Blomquist

admitted that a "defect" in the bicycle had caused the accident.
What in fact Mr. Blomquist actually admitted was that a
"malfunction" in the bicycle had caused the accident.
Para. 5; R. 683, Para. 5)

(R. 679,

There is a significant difference in

the definitions of "defect" and "malfunction".
Therefore, based upon the foregoing responses, the defendant
CBC disputes such statements made by the plaintiff concerning the
relevant facts of the case.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The plaintiff has failed to establish prima facie cases of a
products liability action, and a spoliation of evidence action
against the defendant CBC, therefore there is no genuine issue of
material fact in this case that would preclude the entry of a
motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant CBC, as a
matter of law.
3

In order to establish a prima facie case against the
defendant CBC in a products liability action, the plaintiff must:
1)

Identify that component of CBC's product that
allegedly caused the injury;

2)

Show that the product had not been modified
or altered from the time it left defendant
CBC until the time of the accident;

3)

Show that the product was defective and
unreasonably dangerous; and

4)

Show that the defective condition proximately
caused the plaintiff's injury.

Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co,, 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979)
and Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6

(1977, as amended).

The plaintiff

must establish by a preponderance of the evidence each and every
element of his products liability action.
Sprincrville, 725 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1986) .

See Weber v.
In the case at bar, the

plaintiff has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence items
two, three, or four of the test to establish a prima facie case
of products liability against the defendant CBC as required by
Hahn.
In addition, the plaintiff has not established a prima facie
case of spoliation of evidence against CBC.

In order to prove a

prima facie case of spoliation, the plaintiff must first find
that CBC is vicariously liable for the alleged acts of BC in
allegedly destroying a defective part.

Under agency law in Utah,

the existence of an agency relationship, and the scope of the
authority of the agent, must be determined from the acts and

4

conduct of the principle, not the agent.

See City Elec. v. Dean

Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983) .

In the

case at bar, the plaintiff has not established that BC was CBC's
agent acting within the scope of its authority when it allegedly
spoliated evidence.

The plaintiff has submitted no evidence,

whatsoever, that show that CBC authorized BC to spoliate
evidence.

Furthermore, neither Mr. Blomquist nor the BC were

under a duty to preserve any of the parts allegedly removed from
the plaintiff's bicycle, nor were they on notice that a products
liability action would be filed against them at the time the part
was allegedly discarded.
Therefore, the defendant CBC respectfully submits that this
Court affirm its motion for summary judgment based upon the fact
that the plaintiff has not shown a prima facie case of a products
liability action nor a spoliation of evidence action.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I,
THE ADMISSION BY BC THAT THE PIAINTIFF#S BICYCLE
MALFUNCTIONED CAUSING HIM INJURY, ALONE. DOES NOT CREATE
A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE THE
ENTRY OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS MATTER OF LAW.
The standard which applies to motions for summary judgment
are stated in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule

56 basically states that "a motion for summary judgment should be
granted only if the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law."

Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah

1982) . Where no material fact remains at issue, the Utah Court
of Appeals reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for
correctness.

Dvbowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445, 446

(Utah App. 1989).
The plaintiff contends that the admission by Mr. Blomquist
that Dr. Burn's bicycle malfunctioned causing him to get into an
accident is a material issue of fact that precludes entry of
summary judgment.

Appellant's Brief Page 14-15.

Plaintiff

argues that because the "defendants' expert testified that in his
opinion the brakes could not have caused the accident/ the
admission of the defendant that a malfunction of the bicycle
caused the accident creates a factual dispute which precludes
summary judgment." Id.
6

The mere "existence of disputed facts will not defeat
summary judgment when the plaintiff fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
his case, and on which he will bear the burden of proof at
trial."

Garzee v. Barklev, 828 P.2d 334, 337 (Idaho App. 1992);

See also, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct.
2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
In the case at bar, plaintiff attempts to create a disputed
fact without establishing the elements essential to his case.
This case is a personal injury products liability action.

In

order to prove a prima facie case against the defendant the
plaintiff must:
(1) Identify that component of CBC's product that
allegedly caused the injury;
(2) Show that the product had not been modified or
altered from the time it left CBC until the time of the
accident;
(3) Show that the product was defective and
unreasonably dangerous; and
(4) Show that the defective condition proximately
caused the plaintiff's injury.
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah
1979); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6 (1977, as amended). (R. 471).
The plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence each and every element of his products liability action.
7

See Weber v. Sprinqville, 725 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1986).

"A mere

possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter
remains one of pure speculation or conjecture . . . it becomes
the duty of the court to direct the verdict for the defendant."
Id. at 1367.

In our case, plaintiff has suggested that the brake

was the component that allegedly caused the injury.

CBC will

assume for the sake of this argument, only, that the front brake
caused the accident.

Plaintiff has not shown by a preponderance

of the evidence numbers two, three, or four of the test to
establish a prima facie case of products liability against the
defendant CBC as required by Hahn.
The United States Supreme Court stated in Celotex that:
[f]acts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when
the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case.
In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue of
material fact," since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
party's case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial•
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-33, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-58.
This is the exact circumstance in the case at bar.

The

alleged facts in dispute of whether the brakes could or could not
have caused the accident are not material because the plaintiff
cannot prove a prima facie case of a products liability action
against CBC.

The trial court concluded that there was admissible

evidence to the effect that the brakes on the plaintiff's bicycle
malfunctioned, and that the malfunction caused the accident, but
that such evidence was not material, and therefore, did not
8

create a material issue of fact that would preclude granting
CBC's summary judgment motion.

(R. 656).

In Horaan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751 (Utah
1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the mere existence of a
genuine issue of fact in the case, as a whole, does not preclude
entry of a motion for summary judgment if those issues are
immaterial to the resolution of the case.

See, Heglar Ranch,

Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 139 (Utah 1988); Norton v. Blackham,
669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983).
In a case similar to the one at bar, plaintiff's brought
suit under an Alabama Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, alleging
that the brakes on their 1986 Chevrolet Cavalier failed as a
result of a defect.

Brooks v. Colonial Chevrolet-Buick, 579

So.2d 1328, 1332 (Ala. 1991) (quoting Thompson v. Lee, 439 So.2d
113 (Ala. 1983)).

The trial court granted the defendant's motion

for summary judgment because there was no evidence of any defect
shown by the plaintiff.

The Alabama Supreme Court stated that

the:
[f]ailure of a product does not presuppose the
existence of a defect. The fact that someone was
injured while using a product does not establish that
the product was unreasonably dangerous when put to its
intended use.
Id.
The court noted that the only evidence the plaintiff's presented
concerning a defect was their own testimony as to the alleged
defectiveness of the brakes and the alleged injuries they
9

suffered as a result.

Id. at 1333.

The court concluded that

such evidence amounted to mere speculation and conclusorv
statements insufficient to prove a prima facie case, and found
that the trial court properly entered the summary judgment in
favor of the defendant.

Id.

Brooks is very similar to the case at bar.

In our case/ the

plaintiff alleges that a defective brake on his bicycle caused
his accident which resulted in his personal injuries.

Plaintiff

relies heavily upon Mr. Blomquist's admission that a
"malfunction" caused the accident, and implies that a
"malfunction" equates into a "defective" product.
incorrect.

This is simply

The definition of "malfunction" is "to function badly

or imperfectly."

The definition of "defective" is "falling below

an accepted standard in regularity and soundness of form or
structure."

Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1976).

These words have completely different meanings.

The word

"malfunction" means that something did not work perfectly.

In

contrast/ the word "defective" means a product that falls below
an accepted standard.

The plaintiff must prove that the brake

was in a "defective" and unreasonably dangerous condition when it
left CBC's plant/ not that it merely "malfunctioned."

A product

can "malfunction" without it being "defective."
There is no physical evidence to support the conclusorv and
speculative statement made by the non-expert plaintiff that the

10

brakes on his bicycle were "defective."

(R. 479). In the

plaintiff's deposition the following conversation took place:
Q.
Now, on other thing, you made the statement that
you didn't think it was Mr. Blomquist's fault,
that
it was the brake's fault. Is that -A.

I said that, yes.

Q.

Now, but you don't know whose fault it is that the
brake malfunctioned?

A.

Pretty ignorant of me to say that, stupid or
ignorant.

Q.

No, Brian, what I am saying, you don't know whose
fault it is the brake malfunctioned?
Mr. Hanson: Well, I am not - - Okay, go ahead.
said he thinks the brake malfunctioned.

A.

The witness: I feel, what little I know of it, I
am not an expert.

Q.

But, you don't know, assuming there was a brake
malfunction of some sort, you don't know whose
[fault] that is?

A.

Correct.

He

[Deposition B. Burns, 188:2-15, R. 473.] [Emphasis Added.]
The plaintiff cannot rely on his unsubstantiated conclusory
and speculative statements set forth under oath to create a
material issue of fact.
1985).

Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah

Consequently, based upon the fact that the plaintiff can

not established three of the elements of a prima facie case of a
products liability action against the defendant CBC, whether or
not the front brake malfunctioned cannot create a genuine issue
of material fact that would appropriately preclude this court
11

from affirming the trial courts entry of summary judgment in
favor of the defendant CBC.

Celotex, 106 S.Ct. 248 (1985);

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 106 S.Ct. 3505 (1985).

POINT II,
THE PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE A PRIMA FACIE
CASE OF SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE AGAINST CBC
TO PRECLUDE ENTRY OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
The plaintiff contends that CBC is vicariously liable for
the alleged acts of BC in allegedly destroying a defective part.
Appellant's Brief Page 16.

The plaintiff attempts to impute

vicarious liability to CBC under the theory that BC was the agent
for CBC when it allegedly destroyed a defective part.
It is well established in Utah that the existence of an
agency relationship, and the scope of the authority of the agent#
must be determined from the acts and conduct of the principle,
not the agent.

See, City Elec. v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth.

672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983).

In the case at bar, the plaintiff

must establish through CBC that BC was its agent and that BC was
acting within the scope of its authority when it allegedly
spoliated the evidence.

The plaintiff has submitted no evidence,

whatsoever, that shows that CBC authorized BC to destroy
evidence.
In Zions First Nat. Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d
1090, 1094 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court stated that:
12

[u]nder agency law, an agent cannot make its principle
responsible for the agent's actions unless the agent is
acting pursuant to either actual or apparent authority.
Actual authority incorporates the concepts of express
and implied authority. Express authority exists
whenever the principal directly states that its agent
has the authority to perform a particular act on the
principals behalf. Implied authority, on the other
hand, embraces authority to do those acts which are
incidental to, or are necessary, usual, and proper to
accomplish or perform, the main authority expressly
delegated to the agent.
Id.
The plaintiff in our case has not presented any evidence
showing that CBC had given BC any authority to spoliate evidence.
The plaintiff has no admissible evidence that establishes
authority given by CBC to BC.

All plaintiff has is the testimony

of Mr. Blomquist, the purported agent, of his understanding of
the authorization.

(R. 553). Nowhere does the plaintiff assert,

much less identify, facts to support the proposition that CBC
authorized BC to allegedly spoliate evidence in potential
products liability actions.

Mr. Blomquist testified to the

following in his deposition taken on April 4, 1990:
Q.

. . . Now, you mentioned earlier, when the
associate brought the bike in, you don't recall if
you inspected it only or kept it overnight. In
any event, did you repair it that day, whatever
had to be done to it?

A.

I did repair the bike, yes.

Q.

Do you recall what you did to it?

A.

I took the brake cable apart, suspecting that
could have been the problem. I re-greased the
cable, put it back together. There was no
problems at that time, there were not problems,
really, when I took it apart.
13

Q.

Okay.

A.

And I just made sure the brake was centered
correctly for the wheel and put it in the back
room and waited for somebody to come pick it up.

Q.

So, the brake assembly was never changed on the
bike;

A.

Correct.

[P. Blomquist Deposition, 41-42:11-2, R. 572]

[Emphasis Added].

In addition, under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
there are three basic elements for determining whether an
employee is acting within the scope of employment:
1)

the employee's conduct must be of a general kind
and nature that the employee is hired to perform;

2)

the conduct must occur within the hours of the
employee's work and the ordinary spatial
boundaries of the employment; and

3)

the employee's conduct must be motivated, at least
in part, by the purpose of serving the employer's
interest.

J.H. v. West Valley City, 197 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1992) .
In the case at bar, the alleged acts of BC in spoliating
evidence were not motivated by serving CBC's interest.
Spoliation of evidence is contrary to the interest of CBC.
Therefore, there can be no presumption of authorization when the
actions of BC were contrary to the interest of CBC.
Therefore, based upon the foregoing arguments, CBC is not
liable for BC's alleged act of spoliating evidence in this case.
Plaintiff incorrectly states in his Appellate Brief that the
trial court in its order on the motion for summary judgment,
14

found that there was admissible evidence to support the claims
that Mr. Blomquist admitted the "defective" part was discarded.
Appellant's Brief Page 16.

As stated previously in the section

dealing with relevant facts in the case, this is plainly an
incorrect statement by the plaintiff.

The trial court's order

for summary judgment concluded only that:
as a matter of law, that the plaintiff could not prove
a case of spoliation of the evidence without expert
testimony setting forth that the part that had been
discarded could have, under certain circumstances,
caused the accident described by the plaintiff if that
part were defective or unreasonably dangerous, or
negligently installed. (R. 679).
The trial court required competent evidence to establish
that the purportedly discarded part was material to the
establishment of the products liability claim.
not have the evidence to establish materiality.
importantly, however,

The plaintiff did
More

the plaintiff has no admissible evidence

that a part was discarded.
The plaintiff cites cases that purportedly set out the
general rule that the destruction of or spoliation of relevant
evidence raises the inference that the evidence would have been
unfavorable to the case of the spoliator, and is sufficient
foundation for his guilt or negligence.

Appellant's Brief 16-17.

The plaintiff's theory of spoliation would require a presumption
of defect whenever any repair service discards a part.
cannot be the law.

15

This

The cases plaintiff cite are distinguishable from the case
at bar.

In National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115

F.R.D. 543 (N.D.Cal. 1987), the plaintiff's sought sanctions
against the Veterans Administration ("VA") for destruction of
discoverable documents and other discovery abuses.

The VA had

been involved in litigation for a period of three years prior to
the destruction of the discoverable documents.

The court in

Turnage focused mainly upon the notice aspect of the case.

The

court highlighted the fact that the VA had sufficient notice of
the discovery obligations it had to the plaintiff due to the
three years of litigation that preceded, and that with such
notice it deliberately destroyed relevant documents.

.Id. at 557.

In the case at bar, no litigation had been filed or even
threatened at the time the purported spoliation of evidence
occurred.
In addition, in Nation-Wide Check v. Forest Hills
Distributors, 692 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1982), which the plaintiff
has cited in his appellate brief, the court held that:
[t]he inference depends, of course, on a showing that
the party had notice that the documents were relevant
at the time he failed to produce them or destroyed
them. The adverse inference is based on two
rationales, one evidentiary and one not. The
evidentiary rationale is nothing more than the common
sense observation that a party who has notice that a
document is relevant to litigation and who proceeds to
destroy the document is more likely to have been
threatened by the document than is a party in the same
position who does not destroy the document. . . . The
other rationale for the inference has to do with its
prophylactic and punitive effects allowing the trier of
16

fact to draw the inference presumably deters parties
from destroying evidence before it can be introduced at
trial.
Id. at 218.
In both of these cases cited by the plaintiff, the main
reason for the adverse inference was based upon the fact that the
spoliator had sufficient notice that the documents were
discoverable items, yet they proceeded to destroy the documents
regardless.

The emphasis was put on the purposely and wrongfully

destroying of documents which they knew were supportive of the
opponents interest.

This was the holding in May v. Moore, 424

So. 2d 596, 603 (Ala. 1982), which the plaintiff also cites to
support the inference of guilt or negligence.

Appellant's Brief

Pages 16-17.
In the case at bar, Mr. Blomquist and the BC were asked to
repair the plaintiff's bicycle.

(R. 558). As part of the normal

practice of repairing bicycles, they would discard a used or
broken part.
parts.

No one asked BC to preserve or return any discarded

Neither Mr. Blomquist nor the BC were under a duty to

preserve any of the parts allegedly removed from the plaintiff's
bicycle.

(R. 558) . The plaintiff presented no admissible

evidence that a part was discarded by BC.

(R. 572) . In

addition, neither CBC nor BC were on notice that a products
liability action was being considered or would be filed against
them at the time the plaintiff's bicycle was taken in for
repairs.

(R. 558). Since there was no duty on the part of CBC
17

or BC to preserve such parts, and neither CBC nor BC had notice
of a lawsuit at that time/ there cannot be any "wrongful/ illegal
and intentional" act of spoliating evidence in this case.
The plaintiff is merely speculating that an alleged
defective product was destroyed/ intentionally/ by the BC in
order to prevent the plaintiff from prevailing in subsequent
litigation.

Appellant's Brief Page 17.

There has been no

evidence to support such an allegation and there would therefore
be insufficient facts that would allow a trier of fact to reach
such a conclusion.
Based upon the foregoing/ the plaintiff cannot prove a prima
facie case of spoliation of evidence against CBC/ and therefore
this court should affirm CBC's motion for summary judgment.

CONCLUSION
The trial court's order granting the defendant's motion for
summary judgment was correct.

The plaintiff raises no genuine

issues of material fact in his Appellant's Brief which would
preclude this court from affirming the trial courts order
granting the defendant CBC's motion for summary judgment.

Based

upon the fact that the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima
facie case of a products liability action/ nor a spoliation of
evidence action against the defendant CBC/ there is no genuine

18

issue of material fact in this case, and as a matter of law,
defendant CBC respectfully submits that this court should affirm
it's motion for summary judgment.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONN
Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2 gives this court jurisdiction to
hear this appeal.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it granted

plaintiff's motion for protective order regarding plaintiff's
business records/ when no showing of "good cause" was made?

2.

Whether there is an ethical obligation and/or duty on

the court and participating attorneys, as officers of the court,
to disclose to the appropriate agencies, information found in
documents produced during discovery which provide a prima facie
case of violations of the laws of the State of Utah?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following rules and statutes are applicable to issues on
cross-appeal.
Rule 26 (c), Protective Orders, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by
the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good
cause shown, the court in which the action is pending
or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition,
the court in the district where the deposition is to be
taken may make any order which justice requires to

1

protect a party or person from annoyance/
embarrassment/ oppression, or undue burden or expense,
including one or more of the following:
(1) that the discovery not be had;
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified
terms and conditions/ including a designation of the
time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking
discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired intof or that
the scope of the discovery be limited to certain
matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present
except persons designated by the court;
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only
by order of the court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research/
development/ or commercial information not be disclosed
or be disclosed only in a designated way;
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified
docioment or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to
be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole
or in part, the court may, on such terms and conditions
as are just# order that any party or person provide or
permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4)
apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to
the motion.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-53(15)/ Unprofessional Conduct.
(15) Any conduct or practice/ contrary to the
recognized standards of ethics of the chiropractic
profession/ or any conduct or practice which does or
might constitute a danger to the health/ welfare or
safety of the patient or public, or any conduct/
practice or condition which does or might impair the
ability to practice chiropractic safely and skillfully.
2

Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-52(1) (1953, as amended).
(1) The director of the division, upon the written
recommendation of the board, may suspend, revoke or
refuse to renew any license to practice chiropractic in
this State, or may place the licensee on probation in
the following cases:
(a) If the applicant or licensee is not of good
moral character or has been guilty of unprofessional
conduct;
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35(1).
(1) The director upon the written recommendation of
the board, shall deny an application for a license to
practice medicine or shall discipline a physician
licensed or otherwise lawfully practicing in this State
in the following cases:
(a) If the applicant or licensee is not of good
moral character or has been guilty of unprofessional
conduct as defined in this Act;
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-36(9) (1953, as amended).
"Unprofessional conduct" as relating to the practice of
medicine includes:
(9) Aiding and abetting the practice of medicine
by one not licensed or by one whose license is
suspended; or practicing as a partner-agent, or
employee of, or in joint venture with, any person who
does not hold a license to practice medicine within
this State;

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1)

This is a personal injury action wherein the plaintiff,

Dr. Brian Burns, alleges that he sustained injury to his left
wrist, neck, lower back and head as a result of a bicycle
accident that occurred on August 16, 1986.

He asserts that the

Cannondale bicycle that he was riding was defective, causing him
3

to go over the handlebars while he was traveling at approximately
twenty-five miles an hour on the bicycle.

The bicycle was sold

to him by the defendant The Bicycle Center ("BC").

Both

defendants deny that the bicycle was in any manner defective.
Both defendants assert that the accident occurred as a result of
Dr. Burns' conduct.
2)

(R. 395) .

Discovery was ongoing in this case since approximately

April, 1990.

The defendant Cannondale Bicycle Company ("CBC")

had to file two motions to compel for the plaintiff to respond
appropriately to discovery.
compel.

The court granted those motions to

In the second motion to compel, the court awarded

attorneys' fees against the plaintiff and in favor of the
defendant CBC.
3)

(R. 395) .

In the plaintiff's deposition, he asserted that he

sustained loss of income as a result of the bicycle accident
exceeding the sum of $250,000.

The defendants requested that the

plaintiff produce his business records, and those of Burns
Chiropractic Clinic, Inc. in order to determine the accuracy of
this claim.

The records were formally requested from Dr. Burns

through a Request for Production of Documents.

The records of

Burns Chiropractic Clinic were obtained using a Subpoena Duces
Tecum.

Five pages were produced on October 7, 1991, by Dr.

Burns' accountants, Sorensen, Chido & May, pursuant to a Subpoena
Duces Tecum served upon them on September 23, 1991.

For the most

part, the records that were the subject of the plaintiff's Motion
4

for Protective Order were financial records that were produced on
August 9, 1991/ and September 12, 1991•

The documents produced

on August 9, 1991, were produced pursuant to a Request for
Production of Documents sent to Dr. Burns.

The documents

produced on September 12, 1991, were produced pursuant to the
Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of Records of Deposition served
on the Burns' Chiropractic Clinic, Inc..
4)

(R. 3 97).

At no time prior to the production of any of these

financial records was any stipulation reached between plaintiff's
counsel and defense counsel for CBC regarding those records.

(R.

415-17) .
5)

The only stipulation reached regarding protecting

information received in discovery is found in pages 124 and 125
of Dr. Burns' deposition.

(R. 413-14).

In that stipulation,

counsel for the respective parties agreed that Dr. Burns' concept
of "working smarter" as outlined in the deposition, and that the
sealed portion of the deposition would be kept confidential for
use in this litigation only.

There was no other oral or written

stipulation regarding confidentiality of information received in
discovery agreed upon by plaintiff's counsel with counsel for the
defendant CBC prior to the documents being produced.

Subsequent

to the production of the documents on September 12, 1991, counsel
for CBC agreed not to disclose the contents of the documents
outside of his office, other than to clients, until the plaintiff
had filed a Motion for Protective Order.
5

(R. 398) .

6)

At no time prior to October 29, 1991 did the plaintiff

seek a protective order from the court regarding the financial
records sought to be kept confidential•

The documents that

plaintiff seeks to keep confidential were produced six to eight
weeks prior to filing a Motion for Protective Order.
7)

(R. 3 9 8 ) .

The documents that the plaintiff wanted to protect

established a prima facie case of violation by Dr. Burns and Dr.
Robert Morrow, an orthopedic surgeon, licensed to practice
medicine in the State of Utah, of their respective professional
licensing acts.

The records further established a prima facie

case of perjury on the part of Dr. Burns when compared with his
deposition testimony.

(R. 413-14).

Dr. Burns testified that he

had no fee-sharing arrangement with Dr. Morrow.

(R. 4 1 4 ) .

The

documents show otherwise.
8)

Dr. Morrow is an orthopedic surgeon who has his

professional office in the same building as on of Dr. Burns'
chiropractic clinics located at approximately 4500 S. 650 E.,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
Burns 7 in this case.
9)

Dr. Morrow is a treating physician for Dr.
(R. 398).

After the documents were produced on September 12, 1991,

plaintiff's counsel requested that defense counsel not disclose
those documents to anyone other than staff in defense counsel's
office working on the case, and clients.

Defense counsel agreed

to do so in order to allow plaintiff's counsel time to file a
Motion for Protective Order.
6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Rule 26(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, contemplates that
a Protective Order must be issued from the court in advance of
the actual discovery.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26(c).

Specifically, Rule 26(c)(7) states "that a trade secret or other
confidential research, development, or commercial information not
be disclosed

..."

In the case at bar, discovery was done in August and
September of 1991.

(R. 398). Plaintiff's Motion for Protective

Order was not filed until October 29, 1991, after the plaintiff's
business records had already been produced to defendant CBC.

By

producing such business records without first procuring a
protective order constituted a waiver of that privilege.

Gold

Standard v. American Resources, 805 P.2d 164, 171 (Utah 1990).
Therefore, the plaintiff has waived any protection that he may
have had by producing such business records in advance of a
stipulation or protective order.
In addition, based upon the requirements of Rule 26(c) (7),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "good cause" must be shown in
order to invoke a protective order.

In the case at bar,

plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order did not provide any
information concerning the specifics of why the business records
of Burns' Chiropractic Clinics were confidential and required
protection.

"Purported trade secrets and other confidential

commercial information enjoy no automatic protection from
7

disclosure."

Turick by Turick v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 121

F.R.D. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

". . . [T] o show good cause a party-

must demonstrate that disclosure of allegedly confidential
information will work a clearly defined and very serious injury
to his business."

United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40# 46

(S.D.N.Y. 1975).

Conclusory allegations in an attorney's

affidavit/ that disclosure of trade secrets would hurt the
businessf does not satisfy the requisite showing of good cause.
Turick, 121 F.R.D. at 35.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff has made conclusory
assertions that the business records contained trade secrets that
needed protection.

(R. 378) . The plaintiff did not show any

"good cause" for the protective order.

Therefore/ the plaintiff

has not met his burden of proof and the trial court abused its
discretion when it granted plaintiff's Motion for Protective
Order.
Thirdly, the court and counsel/ as officers of the court/
have a duty to disclose to the appropriate authorities,
information found in documents produced/ which provide a prima
facie case of the violation of the laws of the State of Utah.
Based upon a letter received from the Department of Professional
Licensing/ the alleged acts of fee-sharing between the plaintiff/
Dr. Burns/ and Dr. Morrow are violations of their respective
professional codes of conduct and Utah State law.

Therefore,

these documents that purport to show a fee-sharing arrangement
8

should be turned over to the appropriate agencies for
investigation even if such documents were protected by a
protective order as alleged by the plaintiff.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED ANY CLAIM FOR CONFIDENTIALITY
IN THE DOCUMENTS BY PRODUCING THEM IN ADVANCE OF
A STIPULATION OR ORDER,
Rule 26(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, contemplates that
a Protective Order must be issued from the court in advance of
the actual discovery.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26(c).

Specifically, Rule 26(c)(7) states "that a trade secret or other
confidential research, development, or commercial information not
be disclosed

..."

In the case at bar, the discovery was done in August and
September of 1991.

(R. 398). The Motion for Protective Order

was not filed until October 29, 1991, after the plaintiff's
business records had already been produced to defendant CBC
pursuant to a Request for Production of Documents sent to the
plaintiff on August 9, 1991, and a Subpoena Duces Tecum and
Notice of Deposition on September 12, 1991.

(R. 397).

In Gold Standard v. American Resources, 805 P.2d 164 (Utah
1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that the defendant Getty,
waived its work product protection by inadvertent disclosure to
the plaintiff.

The Court noted that by voluntarily producing
9

memoranda in response to plaintiff's demand for production of
documents, the defendant waived his right to the protection
afforded work products.

Id. at 171.

In that case, which is

analogous to the case at bar, the defendant waited to file its
Motion for Protective Order until after the documents were
already produced to the plaintiff.

The court stated that "[t]he

inaction and delay in filing constitute an independent waiver of
whatever right Getty may have been able to assert, and the trial
judge should have so found."

Id. at 172.

Although Gold Standard involved work product protection, the
analogy can be made that by failing to demonstrate diligence in
procuring a protective order for confidential information,
disclosing such information prior to securing a protective order,
is in fact a waiver of that privilege.

And in the case at bar,

that is exactly what the plaintiff did by not procuring a
protective order prior to disclosing the business records of
Burns Chiropractic Clinics.
Contrary to the assertions made by plaintiff's counsel in
his Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective Order, the
only stipulation entered into by counsel during the plaintiff's
deposition was specifically limited to plaintiff's testimony
regarding the concept of "working smarter", which was discussed
in the sealed portion of his deposition.

(R. 384-85).

At no

time prior to the production of any of the financial records was
any stipulation reached between plaintiff's counsel and defense
10

counsel for CBC regarding those records.

(R. 3 97).

There was no

other oral or written stipulation regarding confidentiality of
information received in discovery agreed upon by plaintiff's
counsel with defense counsel for CBC prior to the documents being
produced.

(R. 397) .

Subsequent to the production to documents

on September 12, 1991, counsel for CBC agreed not to disclose the
contents of the documents outside of his office, other than to
clients, until the plaintiff had filed a Motion for Protective
Order.

(R. 398) .

The terms of the stipulation entered into by

counsel during plaintiff's

deposition relate only to the sealed

portion of the deposition and do not relate to the business
records produced in response to subsequent discovery.
Plaintiff's counsel failed to obtain a protective order with
regard to these records prior to their production to defendant
CBC, and by failing to do so, plaintiff has waived his right to
obtain a protective order with regard to the business records in
dispute.
Where such a stipulated agreement was allegedly made, a
prudent thing to do would be to put such alleged stipulations
into the record or in writing to erase any questions as to what
was agreed upon.

Where there is no admissible evidence of such a

stipulation in the record or in writing, like in the case at bar,
there should be a presumption that such an alleged stipulation
did not occur.

11

Therefore, defendant CBC respectfully submits that this
court should find that the trial court abused its discretion by
granting plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order concerning these
business records.
POINT II,
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SHOW GOOD CAUSE AND
EVIDENCE OF SPECIFIC DAMAGE LIKELY TO RESULT
FROM DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS RECORDS,
In reviewing a trial court's conclusion of law, the Court of
Appeals applies a correction of error standard with no deference
to the trial court.

Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah

App. 1989), certiorari granted 779 P.2d 688, affirmed 788 P.2d
520.
The basis for the plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order is
found in Rule 26(c) (7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R. 375).

Rule 26(c)(7) specifically states:
[t]hat a trade secret or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information not be disclosed
or be disclosed only in a designated way . . .
The plaintiff alleges that the business records of Burns'
Chiropractic Clinics contain trade secrets and confidential
business practices that are confidential.

(R. 378). Rule 26(c)

specifically provides that:
[u]pon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, may make
any order which justice requires to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense . . . (Emphasis added)

12

The critical language in Rule 26(c) is "for good cause
shown."

The plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order did not

provide any information concerning the specifics of why the
business records of Burns' Chiropractic Clinics were confidential
and required protection.

(R. 378). The plaintiff's Motion for

Protective Order made no showing of "good cause" whatsoever, but
merely asserted the protection of Rule 26(c)(7) with not
explanation.

(R. 378).

In Turick By Turick v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 121 F.R.D.
32 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the defendants moved to dismiss a protective
order and to compel discovery in a products liability action
arising out of an accident involving an all-terrain vehicle
("ATV").

In that case, the defendant made a Motion for a

Protective Order, pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, to limit the dissemination of its purported
trade secrets and other confidential research, development and
commercial information that may have been produced during
litigation.

The District Court held that "[p]urported trade

secrets and other confidential commercial information enjoy no
automatic protection from disclosure.

Id. at 35 (citing United

States v. IBM. 67 F.R.D. 40, 42, n.l (1975).

The court went

further and noted that:
[i]n order to show that certain designated information
should be protected under Rule 26(c) this court
requires the party seeking such a protective order to
show: (1) that the information rises to the level of a
trade secret. United States v. IBM, supra, 67 F.R.D. at
13

46; and (2) that there is good cause to protect the
information, Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c). . . . In this court,
to show good cause a party must demonstrate that
disclosure of allegedly confidential information will
work a clearly defined and very serious injury to his
business.
United States v. IBM, supra, 67 F.R.D. at 46 (Emphasis in
original).
In Turick, the court concluded that the defendant "merely
made conclusory allegations" in an attorney's affidavit, that
disclosure of highly sensitive trade secret materials would hurt
the defendant's competitive position in the ATV market.
121 F.R.D. at 35.

Turick,

Consequently, the court held that the

defendant did not make the requisite showing that the information
raised to the level of trade secret or that there was good cause
shown for the protective order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c),
and therefore denied the plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order.
Id.
The case at bar presents situation that is very similar to
the Turick case.

Here the plaintiff has merely made conclusory

assertions that the business records for Burns Chiropractic
Clinics contain trade secrets and confidential business practices
that allegedly require protection.

(R. 378). The plaintiff does

not show any "good cause" by demonstrating how the disclosure
would injure his business.

(R. 378).

The party seeking a

protective order has the burden of proof of showing good cause

14

for the order.

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus,

Co., 529 F.Supp. 866, 890 (1981); Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank/
93 F.R.D. 471# 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In the case at bar, it is
apparent that the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof.

The

plaintiff "cannot generally rely upon his conclusory statements,
but must present evidence of specific damage likely to result
from disclosure."

Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines# Inc., 54

F.R.D. 21, 22-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
In Zenith Radio Corp., the court noted that:
[i]t has also been held that the specific instances
where disclosure will inflict a competitive
disadvantage should be set forth in more than the
briefs or the hearsay allegations of counsel's
affidavit, for a protective order should not issue on
that basis alone. (Emphasis added).
Zenith Radio Corp., at 891.
Therefore, in the case at bar, based upon the foregoing case
law, this court should find that the trial court abused its
discretion when it granted plaintiff's Motion for Protective
Order without the requisite showing of "good cause" and evidence
of specific damage likely to result from disclosing the business
records of Burns' Chiropractic Clinics.

Consequently, defendant

CBC respectfully submits that this court reverse the trial
courts' Motion for Protective Order in favor of the plaintiff.

15

POINT III.
THE COURT AND COUNSEL, AS OFFICERS OF THE COURT, HAVE A
DUTY TO DISCLOSE TO THE APPROPRIATE AGENCIES, INFORMATION
FOUND IN DOCUMENTS PRODUCED, WHICH PROVIDES A PRIMA FACIE CASE
OF THE VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
In the plaintiff's deposition taken on April 19, 1991, the
plaintiff was asked by defense counsel for CBC the following
questions and gave the following responses:
Q: Do you have any type of partnership arrangement
with Dr. Morrow?
A:

No.

Q:

Any fee sharing arrangement?

A: No.
out.

We were originally going to, but it didn't pan

(R. 414). The documents which the plaintiff now seeks to have
ordered confidential show that the plaintiff, or Burns'
Chiropractic Clinics, Inc., paid to, or received from Dr. Morrow
the following amounts in the following years:
1988:

$52,383.91 [Burns to Morrow]

1989:

$43,170.00 [Morrow to Burns]
$1,309.70 [Burns to Morrow]

1990:

$38,302.68 [Morrow to Burns]

The documents show that a portion of this money was paid pursuant
to a fee-sharing agreement.

The fee-sharing agreement was that

Dr. Burns paid 20% of the fee he received from the patients
listed who were referred by Dr. Morrow to Dr. Burns. (R. 400).
Based upon the letter that defense counsel received from the
16

Department of Professional Licensing, this type of fee-sharing
arrangement is in violation of State statute, which the
Department of Professional Licensing will investigate and, if
determined to be accurate, will prosecute.

See Exhibit "A" (R.

409-11) . The penalty that may be issued by the Board of
Professional Licensing includes suspension, revocation or refusal
to renew any license.
The statute that applies to a chiropractor is § 58-12-53(15)
which provides as follows:

"Unprofessional conduct" in relation

to the practice of chiropractic, includes:
(15) Any conduct or practice, contrary to the
recognized standards of ethics of the chiropractic
profession, or any conduct or practice which does or
might constitute a danger to the health, welfare or
safety of the patient or public, or any conduct,
practice or condition which does or might impair the
ability to practice chiropractic safely and skillfully.
§ 58-12-52, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) provides as follows
in pertinent part:
(1) The director of the division, upon the written
recommendation of the board, may suspend, revoke or
refuse to renew any license to practice chiropractic in
this State, or may place the licensee on probation in
the following cases:
(a) If the applicant or licensee is not of good
moral character or has been guilty of unprofessional
conduct;
With respect to Dr. Morrow who is an orthopedic surgeon, the
following statutes apply:

17

Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35(1)•
(1) The director upon the written recommendation of
the board, shall deny an application for a license to
practice medicine or shall discipline a physician
licensed or otherwise lawfully practicing in this State
in the following cases:
(a) If the applicant or licensee is not of good
moral character or has been guilty of unprofessional
conduct as defined in this Act;
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-36(9) (1953, as amended) provides in
relevant part as follows:
"Unprofessional conduct" as relating to the practice of
medicine includes:
(9) Aiding and abetting the practice of medicine
by one not licensed or by one whose license is
suspended; or practicing as a partner-agent, or
employee of, or in joint venture with, any person who
does not hold a license to practice medicine within
this State;
Attached as Exhibit "A" is a letter from the Department of
Professional Licensing stating that fee-sharing by a physician or
chiropractor is a violation of Utah law, which the Department of
Professional Licensing will investigate, and where appropriate,
prosecute.

The documents which plaintiff's counsel attempts this

court to keep confidential provide the basis for the Department
of Professional Licensing to investigate and prosecute both Dr.
Burns and Dr. Morrow.
"Lawyers, including judges, have a duty to report
unprofessional conduct to the appropriate authorities."

See

Blacknell v. State, 502 NE.2d 899, 3 Law.Man.Prof.Conduct 21
(Ind. 1987).

The Code of Judicial Administration states in
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pertinent part:
Cannon 3- A judge should perform duties of the office
impartially and diligently.
(A) Adjudicative Responsibilities
(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence in it.
The Court and Counsel have a duty, as officers of the court,
to disclose to the appropriate authorities, information found in
documents produced which provides a prima facie case of the
violation of the laws of the State of Utah.

As officers of the

court, the trial judge and respective counsel must be faithful
and uphold the laws of the State of Utah.

It would be

inappropriate to order those documents kept confidential.

It

would be appropriate to order that the documents be provided to
the Department of Professional Licensing for investigation.
Because these same documents call into question the
truthfulness of Dr. Burns' statements in his deposition that
there was no fee-sharing arrangement between he and Dr. Morrow,
these documents should also be forwarded to the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office for their review on the issue of whether or not
Dr. Burns should be prosecuted for perjury.

CONCLUSION
Counsel for the defendant CBC respectfully requests that the
court find that the trial court abused its discretion when it
granted plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order on the grounds
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that the plaintiff failed to show good cause and evidence of
specific damage likely to result from disclosure of the business
records.

In the alternative, the plaintiff waived any claim for

confidentiality in the documents by producing them to defendant
CBC prior to securing a protective order.

In addition, the court

and respective counsel have a duty, as officers of the court, to
report unprofessional conduct that violates the laws of the State
of Utah.

Therefore, defendant CBC requests that this court order

that the business records of Burns' Chiropractic Clinics be
delivered to the Department of Professional Licensing and the
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office for further investigation.
DATED thisi^l^r
_

day of MA2&Jk,

1993.

WILLIAMS & HUNT

GARY)
Attos^ieys—fxSlf

Defendant/Appellee/

Cross*Appellant.
Cannondale Bicycle Company
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
MAILED, a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument
by first-class mail, postage prepaid this Jx^T
, 1993 to the following:

Edward T, Wells (A3422)
Robert J. DeBry & Associates
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
Darwin Hansen (A2058)
Morgan & Hansen
136 South Main, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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day of

RYHTBIT A

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing
onnan H. Bangerter
Governor
David L. Buhler
Executive Director
David E. Robinson
Division Director

Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South;P 0. Box 45805
Salt Lake City, Utah 84U5-0805
(801) 530-6628

November 5, 1991

Gary B. Ferguson
Williams & Hunt
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Subject:

Fee Splitting

Dear Mr. Ferguson:
Reference is made to a letter dated November 5, 1991, addressed to
me by your Legal Assistant Susan M. Kertesz. In that letter she
asks for a statement from the division with respect to fee
splitting by physicians and chiropractors.
In reply to that
letter, and with the specific assumption that she is inquiring
about splitting or sharing of fees by a physician with a
chiropractor or by a chiropractor with a physician, the division
offers the following.
Unprofessional conduct is first defined, in part, under 58-1-2(6),
as follows:
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'Unprofessional conduct' means acts, knowledge, and practices
which fail to conform with the accepted standards of the
specific licensed occupation or profession and which could
jeopardize the public health, safety, or welfare and includes
the violation of any statute regulating an occupation or
profession under this title." (emphasis added)
With respect to the practice of a physician specifically, the
pertinent statutory reference in which unprofessional conduct is
identified is as follows:
"58-12-36(9) aiding or abetting the practice of medicine
one not licensed or by one whose license is suspended;
practicing medicine as a partner, agent, or employee of or
joint venture with any person who does not hold a license

by
or
in
to

issstoei

practice medicine within this state;"
In the referenced letter, your office cites the provisions of 5812-53(15) which identifies unprofessional conduct by a chiropractor
as:
"(15) any conduct or practice, contrary to the recognized
standards of ethics of the chiropractic profession, any
conduct or practice that does or might consititute a danger to
the public, or any conduct, practice, or condition which does
or might impair the ability to practice chiropractic safely
and skillfully."
I think we must also refer to the provisions of 58-1-10, which sets
forth unlawful conduct related to all of the professions regulated
under Title 58. It states, in part:
"(1)

It is unlawful for any person to:
(a) practice or engage in or attempt to practice or
engage in any occupation or profession licensed under this
title who is not licensed to do so under this title;
(b) knowingly employ any other person to practice or
engage in or attempt to practice or engage in any occupation
or profession licensed under this title not licensed to do so
under this title."
This same provision is generally restated in the various practice
acts and in the Medical Practice Act, such activity is defined as
a third degree felony.
In applying the above to the specific question posed by your
office, the division's position is as follows:
The publication entitled, 1989 Current Opinions. The Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association,
in Section 6.00, Opinions on Fees and Charges, discusses the
subject of fee splitting.
It is clear that fee splitting is
outside of the accepted standards of the medical profession and
thus is unprofessional conduct.
The chiropractic profession has published a statement of their
standard of ethics which states in Article IV, Section 4:
"It shall be considered unprofessional to split fees or to
give or receive a commission in the reference of patients for
chiropractic service, except in cases where laboratory
services are required and then the patient should be informed
that there is an extra charge for such service"
It is clear that fee splitting is also outside the accepted
standards of the chiropractic profession and is unprofessional
conduct under Utah law.
If a physician is aiding or abetting the practice of medicine by a

>ii n

chiropractor, or practicing medicine with another who is not a
physician, it is unprofessional and unlawful conduct.
If a chiropractor is practicing medicine by his association with a
physician, he is feloniously engaged in the unlicensed practice of
medicine.
The definition of the practice of medicine is so broad in the
statute that I do not think the physician is prevented from
practicing chiropractic and thus the reverse of the above paragraph
would not be valid.
If each is independently practicing within the scope of practice of
their respective professions and simply splitting fees for referral
of patients to one another, it is unprofessional conduct on the
part of the physician and the chiropractor.
Please do not interpret this as a legal opinion. It is offered by
me as the division director to advise you with respect to the
specific question you have raised. If you take issue with the
position taken by the division, I would be pleased to receive your
comment.
Sincerely,

cc:

Steve Davis
Ray Walker
Valaine Pack
Shirlene Kimball
Physicians Licensing Board
Chiropractic Licensing Board

